Itis clear from this data that China recognizes that North Korea is no longer advancing any interest of China and that a united Korea under Seoul control would be beneficial to China , let alone the slaves of North Korea .
Thepress has not really picked up on this, but it clearly explains South Korea ’srecent actions that are deliberately confrontational, whatever they aresaying. What must be under way is astrategic move to topple the North Korean government. With China onside and the USA sitting fat and happy under Obama, every trigger can be field tested.
Theidea is to make the North Koreans provide a pretext for war. They appear to be cooperating.
Theobvious strategy is to land a task force north of the boundary line which isheavily fortified and force North Korean units to leave dug in defenses tooppose the landing force. This allowsair power to be well used. In the endthe boundary line can be out flanked and partially seized opening the door fora swift northward thrust to the North Korean industrial region while the bulkof the North Korean Army is immobilized.
Itis also possible that the North Korean military is even now preparing tosurrender to avoid bloodshed. Dependingon communication, it would be an easy option to put in place for the leadershipwho know the score and have run out of hope.
Wikileaks cables reveal China 'ready to abandon North Korea '
Leaked dispatches show Beijing is frustrated with military actions of 'spoiled child' and increasingly favoursreunified Korea
South Korean war veterans protest after North Korea attacked Yeonpyeong Island . The WikiLeakscables reveal Beijing believes such actions are those of a 'spoiled child'. Photograph: KimKyung-Hoon/Reuters
China hassignalled its readiness to accept Korean reunification and is privatelydistancing itself from the North Korean regime, according to leaked US embassy cables that reveal senior Beijing figures regardtheir official ally as a "spoiled child".
News of the Chinese shift comes at a crucialjuncture after the North's artillery bombardment of a South Korean island lastweek that killed four people and led both sides to threaten war. China hasrefused to condemn the North Korean action. But today Beijing appeared to bow to US pressure to help bring about a diplomatic solution,calling for "emergency consultations" and inviting a senior NorthKorean official to Beijing .
The leaked North Korea dispatches detail how:
• SouthKorea's vice-foreign minister said he was told by two named seniorChinese officials that they believed Korea should be reunified under Seoul 's control, andthat this view was gaining ground with the leadership in Beijing .
• China 'svice-foreign minister told US officials that Pyongyang was behaving like a "spoiled child" to get Washington 's attention in April 2009 bycarrying out missile tests.
• A Chinese ambassador warned that NorthKorean nuclear activity was "a threat to the whole world's security".
• Chinese officials assessed that it couldcope with an influx of 300,000 North Koreans in the event of seriousinstability, according to a representative of an international agency, butmight need to use the military to seal the border.
In highly sensitive discussions in February this year, the-then SouthKorean vice-foreign minister, Chun Yung-woo, told a US ambassador, KathleenStephens, that younger generation Chinese Communist party leaders no longer regarded North Korea as a usefulor reliable ally and would not risk renewed armed conflict onthe peninsula, according to a secret cable to Washington.
Chun, who has since been appointed nationalsecurity adviser to South Korea's president, said North Korea had already collapsedeconomically.
Political collapse would ensue once KimJong-il died, despite the dictator's efforts to obtain Chinese help and tosecure the succession for his son, Kim Jong-un.
"Citing private conversations duringprevious sessions of the six-party talks , Chun claimed [the two high-levelofficials] believed Korea should be unified under ROK [South Korea ] control," Stephens reported.
"The two officials, Chun said, were readyto 'face the new reality' that the DPRK [North Korea] now had little value toChina as a buffer state – a view that, since North Korea's first nuclear testin 2006, had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC [People's Republic ofChina] leaders. Chun argued that in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly 'not welcome' any US militarypresence north of the DMZ [demilitarised zone]. Again citing his conversationswith [the officials], Chun said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunifiedKorea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the US in a 'benign alliance' – aslong as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labour-exportopportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help 'salve' PRCconcerns about … a reunified Korea .
"Chun dismissed the prospect of a possible PRC militaryintervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China's strategiceconomic interests now lie with the UnitedStates, Japan and South Korea – not North Korea."
Chun told Stephens China was unable topersuade Pyongyang to change its self-defeatingpolicies – Beijing had "much less influence than most people believe" – and lacked thewill to enforce its views.
A senior Chinese official, speaking off therecord, also said China 'sinfluence with the North was frequently overestimated. But Chinese publicopinion was increasingly critical of the North's behaviour, the official said,and that was reflected in changed government thinking.
Previously hidden tensions between Pyongyang and its only ally were also exposed by China 's then vice-foreign minister in a meetingin April 2009 with a US embassy official after North Korea blasted a three-stage rocket over Japan into the Pacific. Pyongyangsaid its purpose was to send a satellite into orbit but the US, South Korea and Japan saw the launch as a test oflong-range missile technology.
Discussing how to tackle the issue with the charge d'affaires at the Beijing embassy, He Yafei observed that "North Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a 'spoiled child' inorder to get the attention of the 'adult'. China encouraged the United States,'after some time', to start to re-engage the DPRK," according to thediplomatic cable sent to Washington .
A second dispatch from September last year described He downplaying theChinese premier's trip to Pyongyang , telling theUS deputy secretary of state, James Steinberg: "We may not like them ... [but] they [theDPRK] are a neighbour."
He said the premier, Wen Jiabao, would pushfor denuclearisation and a return to the six-party talks. The official alsocomplained that North Korea "often tried to play China off [against] the United States , refusing to convey information aboutUS-DPRK bilateral conversations".
Further evidence of China 'sincreasing dismay with Pyongyang comes in acable in June 2009 from the US ambassador to Kazakhstan ,Richard Hoagland. He reported that his Chinese counterpart, Cheng Guoping. was "genuinely concerned by North Korea'srecent nuclear missile tests. 'We need to solve this problem. It isvery troublesome,' he said, calling Korea 's nuclear activity a 'threatto the whole world's security'."
Cheng said Beijing "hopes for peacefulreunification in the long term, but he expects the two countries to remainseparate in the short term", Hoagland reported. China 's objectives were "toensure they [North Korean leaders] honour their commitments on non-proliferation,maintain stability, and 'don't drive [Kim Jong-il] mad'."
While some Chinese officials are reported tohave dismissed suggestions that North Korea would implode after Kim's death, another cable offers evidence that Beijing has consideredthe risk of instability.
It quoted a representative from aninternational agency saying Chinese officials believed they could absorb300,000 North Koreans without outside help. If they arrived "all atonce" it might use the military to seal the border, create a holding areaand meet humanitarian needs. It might also ask other countries for help.
The context of the discussions was not madeexplicit, although an influx of that scale would only be likely in the event ofregime failure. The representative said he was not aware of any contingencyplanning to deal with large numbers of refugees.
A Seoul embassycable from January 2009 said China 'sleader, Hu Jintao, deliberately ducked the issue when the South Koreanpresident, Lee Myung-bak, raised it at a summit.
"We understand Lee asked Hu what China thought about the North Korean domestic political situation and whether Beijing had anycontingency plans. This time, Hu apparently pretended not to hear Lee,"it said. The cable does not indicate the source of the reports, althoughelsewhere it talks about contacts at the presidential "blue house" inSouth Korea .
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