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Elizabeth Kolbert: Al Gore and “Our Choice”

Elizabeth Kolbert: Al Gore and “Our Choice”

Al Gore’s new book, “Our Choice,” which comes out today, puts forward a series of proposals for taking on global warming. He spoke to Elizabeth Kolbert recently about what he learned in the course of his research, the rise of Chinese environmentalism, and the current debate over cap-and-trade in Congress.

by Elizabeth Kolbert, The New Yorker, November 3, 2009 

KOLBERT: It’s been three and a half years since “An Inconvenient Truth.” Since then, the fourth International Panel on Climate Change assessment labelled the evidence for human-caused warming “unequivocal,” and you and the members of the I.P.C.C. won the Nobel Peace Prize. Meanwhile, CO2 levels and CO2 emissions have kept rising, or at least emissions were until the current recession. What motivated you to write your new book, “Our Choice?”

GORE: Embedded in your question a is commentary on the contrast between the slow pace of the political process and the continued acceleration of the climate crisis, and that is a point well made. However, I’ve come to believe after many years of working in America’s political process—I would add parenthetically add that I’m a recovering politician now, on about step nine—I’ve come to see it and the world’s political system as having at least one thing in common with the climate system: it’s non-linear.

By that, I mean that the potential for significant change can build up without a noticeable outward manifestation until it reaches a critical mass sufficient to overcome the obstacles holding it back. I think that during these last few years there has undeniably been an awakening in many quarters around the world of the gravity and the seriousness of this climate crisis, and the need to act boldly and quickly.

Even though that pressure for change has not yet led to an international treaty, it has led to some significant changes in awareness and in advocacy, and I feel confident in saying that we are very close to a political tipping point beyond which this pressure for change and reform will be manifested in more national laws and in an effective treaty.

KOLBERT: You make the point several times in the book that if we put a price on carbon emissions, a lot of things would sort themselves out. Congress is now debating exactly that. What do you see happening on the Hill, and what are the prospects for legislation?

GORE: I think the prospects are significantly better than the Las Vegas oddsmakers now believe. I said at an environmental-journalists conference in early October that the amount of bipartisan dialogue going on beyond the scenes was far greater than was generally presumed, and not long after that the Op-Ed by John Kerry and Lindsey Graham provided an aperture through which a lot of people saw that. There is a growing desire on the part of some Republicans, as well as Democrats, to get legislation this year.

I think that the passage of the House bill, with whatever flaws you might want to ascribe to it, is nonetheless a very significant milestone, and I believe the Senate will pass legislation before the Copenhagen conference. I think it’s unlikely that the conference committee will finish its work before then, but President Obama will be able to go to Copenhagen having secured passage in both houses of Congress of legislation that does put a price on carbon and, even though the provisions of the legislation are certainly going to be weaker that I or many others would have written, it will represent the kind of first step that America’s political system is capable of taking right now. The prospective tightening of restrictions of carbon emissions will immediately affect business planning cycles and investment decisions.

Once the world makes it clear that we are going to follow a roadmap to a low-carbon economy, the best-managed businesses will seek to race out in front of that emerging trend. Indeed, you’re already seeing a lot of them do exactly that. And along with the legislation and the treaty, there is also the prospective regulation of CO2 by the E.P.A.; the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision giving a green light to private lawsuits against large CO2 emitters based on tort law; and the prospective requirement to begin, this January 1st, reporting CO2 emissions, a requirement that will cover the emitters of eight-five per cent of the CO2 in the U.S. each year, with the first public release of that annual report coming a year from March.

The last time this kind of reporting mechanism was used, with the toxic reporting initiative, it triggered a mad scramble by the top ten emitters in each city to get off that top ten list.

KOLBERT: What about the Obama Administration? Some people have been critical of its decision to try to get so many big pieces of legislation done at the same time. Do you feel like the Administration is giving global warming the kind of attention it deserves and/or needs?

GORE: That question falls in the crowded category of Things Too Soon to Judge. As the old country lawyer said, “I can argue it either way.” Certainly, it was to the advantage of the climate that the stimulus bill including a very high percentage of green stimulus provisions. It’s also possible to argue that the attention focussed on health care for most of the last six months has allowed bipartisan discussion to go on outside the spotlight to make possible progress quickly before Copenhagen as soon as health care is complete.

Would I have liked to see a lot more focus on climate? Yes, but I also want to give credit where it’s due to the many advances that have occurred in only nine months’ time, and I’ll wait for the more conclusive judgment on legislative strategy.

KOLBERT: Toward the end of the book, you imagine what someone looking back at the year 2009 might think or say. Even in the more optimistic scenario, where progress has been made, the deal that emerges out of Copenhagen is too weak and it’s got to be firmed up in future agreements. We’re just a few weeks out from Copenhagen, and there a lot of people who are worried there’s not going to be any deal. Could you talk about what the prospects for Copenhagen are, and are you going to Copenhagen?

GORE: Oh yes, I’ll be in Copenhagen, and I assume that President Obama will be as well.

KOLBERT: Well, it’s so close to Oslo, after all.

GORE: It’s not far, is it? I think that first of all, the analogy, though perhaps used too often, between the Copenhagen negotiation and the Montreal Protocol of 1987 is still the best analogy available. That treaty was bitterly criticized as being too weak at the time, but it did shift expectations and, only three years later, some of the business opponents of the Montreal Protocol were in London arguing to greatly toughen that agreement. Two years after that—in Copenhagen, ironically—it was toughened much further, and now it is a historic success in the making.

CO2, in comparison to halocarbons, is ubiquitous in the global economy and therefore much more difficult to rein in, but I think the basic model that the world learned in Montreal still does apply.

KOLBERT: One of things you hear being said by the U.S. negotiators—all of whom I know you must know—is that they don’t want to bring home a treaty that they can’t get ratified by the Senate. What do you think of that concern?

GORE: Well, they’re right about that. There is the case to be made for pushing the limits up to the point where leadership and public education can secure ratification of a treaty that goes somewhat farther than what the legislation embodies, but that’s a political judgment call. I do think that the threshold for ratification being seven votes higher than the threshold for breaking a filibuster is a sobering prospect that has to be taken into account. But I think the momentum has already shifted in favor of an agreement, and I would expect to see that shift continue.

I think the high-profile defections from the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturing, and the emergence of new advocates for constraining carbon, like Senator Lindsey Graham, like some of the Fortune 500 companies that were intimidated or opposed from speaking out in the past, is already beginning to make a difference. I think some of the faith-based organizations that are expressing passionate support for a meaningful treaty will continue to make a difference in areas of the country that have been seen as opposed to a treaty in the past, but are now beginning to change their opinions quite significantly.
KOLBERT: While you were doing the research for this book and holding summits, was there anything that surprised you? I know in the book you talk about being an early supporter of corn ethanol and how that promise has not really panned out.

GORE: Just to start with that example, I think that one of the positive achievements of the corn-ethanol program in the U.S. was to establish a distribution infrastructure that is convertible to second-generation ethanol technologies like insomatic hydrolysis and new feedstocks that don’t compete with food crops or the land on which food crops are grown.

But to answer your question in general terms: yes, there were many “aha!” moments for me. It’s always the case, as I’m sure you’ve discovered many times in your own research, that when you look very carefully and deeply into matters that you understood previously well enough to talk about for a few paragraphs but really need to understand, you inevitably find a lot of new insights that are only visible when you really sink into it.
Just to take one example: The opportunity to sequester carbon in soil and simultaneously improve the fertility of soil and fight against the food-insecurity crisis in areas of the developing world—most acutely, in vast areas of sub-Saharan Africa, where the carbon content of their soils is now lower than that carbon content of the Midwestern prairie soil just prior to the dustbowl in the United States. I think that is a very positive congruence of several different human interests that can support one another, as we solve problems simultaneously.

KOLBERT: One of the things that you keep hearing in the debate on climate change is that China isn’t doing anything, which is going to put the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage. That came through in the Kerry-Graham Op-Ed you spoke about. [They proposed a tax on goods that come in from other countries that don’t have the same kind of carbon restrictions.] You spent time in China—is that a fair argument to be making?

GORE: My view is certainly more textured than that. I do spend a lot of time in China, and I’ll be meeting with Premier Wen at a conference in Beijing and presenting my slide show with the graphics in Chinese. During my dialogues with Chinese leaders and activists and others, I have been quite impressed with how far they’ve come in a short period of time.

You know, their new five-year plan has added CO2 reductions to the formula by which bureaucrats and other leaders in the society are judged for promotion and advancement. That’s something I wish we had in the U.S.—they have planted two and a half times more trees than the rest of the world put together in the last several years. There is now a consensus in Chinese society, government, and business on the need to move quickly to CO2 reductions.

They will soon be number one in wind, number one in solar; they are building an eight-hundred-kilovolt super-grid that promises to be the most advanced in the world in less than a decade. And yet they are still opening a new, inefficient, dirty, coal-fired generating plant every eight or nine days.

I do think the direction in which they are moving is clear. Some of these cross-national public-opinion polls, however reliable you think they are, consistently measure the Chinese people at or near the top of the list in terms of the concern and sense of urgency felt about the solving the climate crisis. And that goes with that consensus I’ve mentioned earlier—their media, of course, is not free, but there is a robust debate on the Internet, and Premier Wen has been responding to bloggers!

There is a rising political consciousness in China, and one of the subjects on which the freest debate is allowed is the climate crisis. I choose to see that as half-full and getting closer and closer to full every day.

KOLBERT: One more question. You begin the book with a quote from Kurt Vonnegut, in which he suggested that maybe we should carve on the Grand Canyon for space visitors who come to the earth a century or two from now: “We probably could have saved ourselves, but we were too damned lazy to try very hard … and too damn cheap.” I’d never heard that—it’s arresting. Could you talk a little bit about that, and your decision to put that at the front of the book?

GORE: I had the privilege of knowing and talking with Kurt Vonnegut, and when I was a young man I found his books to be the most compelling and enjoyable that I read at that age. His blend of surrealism and cynicism and dark humor is unique in literature, and when he applied it to the ongoing assault by human civilization on the integrity of the earth’s ecological system, it produced a striking passage that I thought was also unique.

But, in the paragraphs that follow my use of that quote, I make an argument that cynicism and denial have no place when reality still offers hope, and the vast majority of the most knowledgeable climate scientists do believe that we probably still do have time to avoid the worst of the consequences of the climate crisis and set the stage for a long but ultimately successful recovery of the earth’s ecological integrity, to the point where it is again hospitable to human civilization. I believe that very strongly. But one of the obstacles that we confront is the emergence of that kind of despair—so, in a sense, Vonnegut’s quote is intended to startle but also to allow me to make the case that those who want to solve the crisis should keep their guard up against that kind of despair, because it drains energy and is inappropriate and unnecessary at this stage.

Link http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/11/elizabeth-kolbert-al-gore-interview.html

Elizabeth Kolbert: Leading Causes

Leading Causes

by Elizabeth Kolbert, New Yorker, October 5, 2009

On October 13, 1992, the United States became the world’s first industrialized nation to ratify a treaty on climate change. The treaty committed its parties to the important, if awkwardly worded goal of preventing “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” In acknowledgment of the fact that America and its allies were largely responsible for the problem, the pact set a different standard for them; Europe, Japan, Australia, and the United States were supposed to “take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” Signing the instrument of ratification for the treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, President George H. W. Bush noted the special responsibilities that the developed nations were taking on; they “must go further” than the others, he said, and offer detailed “programs and measures they will undertake to limit greenhouse emissions.”

The convention remains in effect, and for the past seventeen years the United States has insisted that it is living up to its terms. Under Bill Clinton, this claim was implausible; the U.S. took no meaningful action to reduce its emissions. Under George W. Bush, it became a bad joke. (When the Bush Administration wasn’t handing out tax breaks to fossil-fuel companies, it was muzzling climate scientists and storming out of international negotiations.) The election of Barack Obama seemed in this, as in so many other areas, to offer a fresh start. A few weeks after his victory, Obama vowed to open a “new chapter” on climate change. And yet, almost a year later, the United States is again—or, really, still—stuck in the same old pattern. We keep saying that we want to be marching at the front of the parade, and then hanging back with the tubas.

Last week at the United Nations, at what was billed as the highest-level meeting on climate change ever, there was general agreement about the approaching disaster. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned that rising temperatures would “increase pressure on water, food, and land; reverse years of development gains; exacerbate poverty; destabilize fragile states; and topple governments.” President Oscar Arias Sánchez, of Costa Rica, described the session as taking place “on the brink of a precipice for our planet.” President Nicolas Sarkozy, of France, stated, “We are the very last generation that can take action.”

“If things go business as usual, we will not live,” President Mohamed Nasheed, of the low-lying Maldives, told the assembled delegates. “We will die. Our country will not exist.”

President Obama, too, was apocalyptic. “We risk consigning future generations to an irreversible catastrophe,” he said in the first of three U.N. addresses. He went on to list the various steps that his Administration has taken—setting new automobile-efficiency standards, investing billions of dollars in weatherizing homes and office buildings, establishing reporting rules for the nation’s largest greenhouse-gas emitters. “The developed nations that caused much of the damage to our climate over the last century still have a responsibility to lead,” he said, before adding, unconvincingly, “And we will continue to do so.”

What would it take for the United States actually to show leadership, instead of just talking about it? First, it would have to impose binding emissions limits of the sort that it has spent the last two decades evading. The Europeans, who are already operating under such constraints, have pledged to cut their emissions by 20% by 2020, and have said that they would agree to a 30% cut if other nations followed suit.

The new Japanese Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, has committed his country to cutting its emissions by twenty-five per cent. In the United States, a bill that would reduce emissions by seventeen per cent narrowly passed the House in June, only to become bogged down in the Senate; it is unclear if the bill will reach the Senate floor this year, or, if so, whether it has the votes to pass. (The United States is using a baseline year of 2005, while the Europeans and the Japanese are using 1990, which means that the proposed American cuts are significantly more modest than they sound.)

There is no reason to doubt Obama’s sincerity about climate change. In addition to the actions he mentioned at the U.N., his Administration has, most significantly, classified carbon dioxide as a pollutant, a move that could eventually lead to its regulation under the Clean Air Act. And the President is clearly frustrated by the stalemate in the Senate. But at this late date sincerity is not enough. When the President proposed that Congress take up a climate bill along with health-care legislation and, on top of that, regulatory reform, he made an enormous gamble. This gamble, at some point, could have been called bold; increasingly, it just seems naïve.

 

For the world to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference,” the United States is, finally, going to have to live up to the commitments it made under the Framework Convention. And, in order for this to happen, Obama is going to have to move climate change to the top of his agenda—quickly. As the President himself put it last week, “The time we have to reverse this tide is running out.”

Link:  http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/10/05/091005taco_talk_kolbert

Elizabeth Kolbert: Canadian tar sands, oil shale, synthetic crude, peak oil, SAGD, bitumen, strip mining, ExxonMobil, Chevron

Unconventional Crude

Canada’s synthetic-fuels boom.

by Elizabeth Kolbert, The New Yorker, November 12, 2007

The town of Fort McMurray occupies a set of irregularly spaced hillsides on either side of the Athabasca River, in northern Alberta. It has a dozen check-cashing joints, a roughly equal number of hotels, and a gaming center called the Boomtown Casino. It also has a museum, which is devoted to the region’s most important resource, the Alberta tar sands. Exhibits include an eight-foot-long rotor, half of a hundred-and-fifty-ton truck, and a pump of Brobdingnagian proportions. Near the entrance to the museum sits a black mound covered by a clear plastic dome. A sign invites visitors to scratch around in the mound with a little retractable rake, then lift up a flap and take a sniff. Tar sands look like dirt and smell like diesel fuel.

The tar sands begin near the border of Saskatchewan, around the latitude of Edmonton, and extend, in three major deposits, north and west almost to British Columbia. All in all, they cover—or, more accurately, underlie—some fifty-seven thousand square miles, an area roughly the size of Florida. It is believed that they were pushed into their present location seventy million years ago by the uplift of the Rocky Mountains.

For the most part, the tar sands consist of quartzite, clay, and water. The other ingredient—the “tar”—is a mixture of very heavy hydrocarbons known as bitumen. Bitumen can be used as a sealant—supposedly the word “mummy” is derived from the term in ancient Persian—and as a paving material. With the right technology, it can also be converted into a form of petroleum known as synthetic crude.

There are two ways to assess the world’s oil supply. One is to consider only conventional reserves—the sort of oil that comes gushing out of the ground. Estimates of conventional reserves vary widely, but most analyses suggest that their output will begin to decline sometime in the next few decades (if it hasn’t already)—a development that so-called “peak oilers” predict will lead to a variety of gruesome consequences, including blackouts, food shortages, and general economic collapse. The second way is to look beyond conventional reserves to unconventional ones, like the tar sands.

It is estimated that there is enough bitumen in Alberta to yield 1.7 trillion barrels of synthetic crude. Assuming that only ten per cent of this is actually recoverable, it still represents the second-largest oil reserve in the world, after Saudi Arabia’s, and more oil than is contained in the reserves of Kuwait, Norway, and Russia put together. Unconventional crude can be found in many other parts of the globe besides Canada; these include eastern Venezuela, which is home to a huge tar-sandslike deposit called the Faja Petrolífera del Orinoco, and portions of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming, where there’s a thick layer of oil shale known as the Green River Formation. Even coal can be converted into liquid fuel. During the Second World War, the Nazis employed a technique called the Fischer-Tropsch process; the same process is now in use in several countries, most notably South Africa, which invested heavily in coal-to-liquids technology during the apartheid era. Build enough coal-to-liquids plants and places like Montana and West Virginia could one day become major petroleum producers.

In Fort McMurray, what might be called the world’s first unconventional oil boom is already under way. Since 2002, Shell, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, and Imperial Oil, which is primarily owned by ExxonMobil, have all received approval to construct major projects in the tar sands; Total has announced its intention to follow suit. Over the next five years, investment in the Fort McMurray area is expected to amount to more than seventy-five billion dollars. Residents of the town have taken to calling it Fort McMoney.

Thanks in large part to what’s happening in the tar sands—output now tops a million barrels a day—Canada has become America’s No. 1 source of imported oil; the country supplies the United States with more petroleum than all of the nations of the Persian Gulf combined. (If you have bought gas recently in Colorado, Ohio, or Indiana—states where tar-sands oil is refined—you are probably driving around with a piece of northern Alberta in your tank.) By 2010, the tar sands’ yield is expected to double, and by 2015 to triple. Crude from the tar sands and other unconventional sources could keep oil flowing well into the middle of the century, and perhaps beyond. Depending on how you look at things, this is either a heartening prospect or a terrifying one.

The company that has been producing oil from the tar sands the longest is known as Suncor. (Suncor used to be a part of Sun Oil, now Sunoco, but today it is owned and operated independently.) One day this summer, I went to take a tour of its operations, which sprawl across several hundred square miles. I was picked up at the entrance to the site by a grandmotherly guide named Gloria Jackson, and together we went to fetch another Suncor official, named Darin Zandee. “There’s no blasts today, so that’s good,” Zandee said, referring to the charges that are periodically set off to loosen the sands. We drove up to a lookout, from which we could see, spread before us, Suncor’s newest mine, the Millennium. Rings of jet-black earthworks were scattered across an enormous pit, an arrangement that might have been based on a blueprint from the Inferno.

The Millennium Mine opened in 2002. Suncor expects to continue to pull tar sands out of it for the next twenty-five years. By then the pit, which is now roughly two miles in diameter, will be six miles across. We drove over the edge of the mine and slowly made our way down to the bottom. There a huge, Mike Mulligan-esque shovel was standing idle. Its bucket hung in midair, steel teeth glinting. Zandee said that to lift one of the teeth would require thirty men—“That gives you a sense of the scale.” A gargantuan truck rumbled by. Zandee estimated that it was carrying about three hundred tons. “That’s some of our smaller equipment,” he said. The largest truck in the mine—the Caterpillar 797B—can haul more than four hundred tons. It has twelve-foot-tall tires, and its cab sits twenty-one feet off the ground. Driving one, I was told, is like trying to steer a house while peering out the window of the upstairs bathroom.

At the Millennium, the tar sands start at a depth of roughly a hundred feet and extend down in a more or less continuous layer, known as the “feed,” for about a hundred and fifty feet. Before mining begins, everything above the feed—trees, bushes, grass, soil, rocks, wildlife—gets scooped up and carted away. (The material is delicately referred to as “overburden.”) Below the tar sands, there’s a thick layer of limestone, the remains of an ancient ocean that once covered Alberta. Suncor mines some of the limestone, too, and uses it to shore up the roads in the pit. What with the overburden and the tar sands and the limestone, Zandee said, “We try to move a million tons a day.” He pointed out a truck in the distance that was dumping a load of tar sands onto what looked like a large platform. The platform was actually a grate, through which the sands were being fed into a giant tank of hot water.

In any given load of sands, only about ten per cent is bitumen; to produce synthetic crude, the other ninety per cent has to be separated out. In the hot-water tank, the sands get spun around; the liberated bitumen is then siphoned off. For every barrel of synthetic crude that Suncor eventually produces, forty-five hundred pounds of tar sands have to be dug up and separated.

We made our way out of the pit and headed on, following the bitumen to its next stop, the upgrader. Along the way, we passed a murky expanse of water with oily scum on the surface. A few dozen scarecrow-like creatures, fixed to empty barrels, were bobbing on top. This, Gloria Jackson explained, was a tailings pond; it held water that had been used in the separation process and was too contaminated with mercury and other toxins to be released back into the Athabasca. (Suncor has nine such ponds, which collectively cover an area of eleven square miles.) The scarecrows, known as “bitumen,” were supposed to discourage birds from landing on the pond and poisoning themselves. Every minute or so, a dull boom filled the air. This was the sound of a propane cannon, another bird-intimidation device.

The primary difference between bitumen and ordinary crude is the size of the hydrocarbon molecules: in liquid oil, these molecules contain between five and twenty carbon atoms, while in bitumen they contain more than twenty. (At room temperature, pure bitumen is so viscous that it will not flow.) The main job of the upgrader is to break down the oversized hydrocarbons into smaller units. We drove along roads with names like Sulphur Street and Diesel Alley and pulled up to a huge refinery-like complex that covered several square blocks. There were dozens of smokestacks and tanks, and more pipes than could possibly be counted. Jackson explained that somewhere inside this maze the bitumen would be “cracked,” at a temperature of nearly nine hundred degrees. After that, in the form of synthetic crude, it would be piped to specially outfitted refineries, either in the United States or Canada, to be converted largely into transportation fuels—gasoline for cars, diesel for trucks, and jet fuel for planes. (Suncor owns a refinery near Denver that processes tar-sands oil.) I had told Jackson that I had twin boys at home, and at the end of the tour she handed me two yellow Matchbox-size versions of the 797B.

American accounts usually give the start of the oil age as 1859, the year that a former railroad conductor named Edwin L. Drake drilled his first successful well, near Titusville, Pennsylvania. Canadian accounts go back a year earlier, to 1858, when a businessman named James Miller Williams decided to dig a well for drinking water outside the town of Bear Creek, Ontario. Instead of water, he struck oil.

Efforts to extract oil from the tar sands soon followed. Entrepreneurs and con men sunk dozens of wells around Fort McMurray in the second half of the nineteenth century. (One enterprising German immigrant who claimed to have struck oil apparently poured the stuff down the hole himself.) Eventually, it became clear that there was no oil, and attention turned to mining the bitumen. In 1930, a former farmer named Robert Fitzsimmons set up the first commercial separation plant in the tar sands; in 1938, Fitzsimmons had to flee Canada to avoid his creditors.

In 1956, an American geologist, Manley Natland, came up with the idea of streamlining the process by using atom bombs. Natland reasoned that “thermal devices” could be lowered into the limestone beneath the tar sands and exploded. This would create cavities into which the bitumen, heated to more than a thousand degrees, would flow and from which it could then be collected. The idea was taken seriously at the highest levels in both Ottawa and Washington—the United States Atomic Energy Commission even agreed to supply a bomb to test Natland’s theory—but it was never implemented. (Beginning in the mid-nineteen-sixties, the Soviet Union actually tried the experiment, setting off half a dozen nuclear explosions to stimulate conventional oil production; production increased, but, unfortunately, much of the oil turned out to be radioactive.)

The technology for removing bitumen from the tar sands is probably still best described as a work in progress. Where the feed lies closest to the surface, as, for example, at the Suncor site, the bitumen is strip-mined and then separated. But most of the tar sands lie too deep to be mined profitably. In these zones, a method known as in-situ extraction is used. In-situ extraction is based on much the same principle as Natland’s scheme, minus the atom bombs. Typically, two horizontal wells are drilled into the sands, one above the other. High-pressure steam is injected into the top well; eventually, the tar sands grow hot enough—nearly four hundred degrees—that bitumen begins to flow into the bottom well. The technical name for this process is Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage, or SAGD (pronounced “sag-dee”).

Whichever method is used, a great deal of energy is required. To produce a barrel of synthetic crude through mining takes roughly eight hundred and ten megajoules, which is the energy content of about an eighth of a barrel of oil. To produce a barrel of synthetic crude through SAGD takes more than sixteen hundred megajoules, which is the energy content of more than a quarter of a barrel of oil. This means that, for every three barrels extracted via SAGD, one has, in effect, been consumed.

Tar-sands oil itself could, in principle, be used to power the operations; in fact, most of the energy used to generate the steam for SAGD, as well as to run all the upgraders and separators, now comes from natural gas. It is estimated that by 2012 tar-sands operations will consume two billion cubic feet of natural gas a day, or enough to heat all the homes in Canada. Such is the demand for natural gas around Fort McMurray that a consortium of companies, including Shell Canada and Imperial Oil, has proposed building a seven-hundred-and-fifty-mile pipeline from the Arctic Ocean through the largely undisturbed wilderness of the Mackenzie River Valley and down into northern Alberta. The proposal, which has been challenged by native and environmental groups, has yet to receive regulatory approval; meanwhile, a variety of other plans have been floated. As it happens, while I was visiting Fort McMurray a company called the Energy Alberta Corporation filed an application to build a pair of nuclear reactors four hundred miles west of town. Early reports stated that the company already had a “large industrial off-taker” lined up to buy nearly three-quarters of the twenty-two hundred megawatts that the reactors would generate. Energy Alberta would not disclose the identity of this “off-taker”; in the local press it seemed to be taken for granted that the power would be going to the tar sands.

The rest of the article is at this link: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/11/12/071112fa_fact_kolbert?currentPage=all